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Appellants Roger Atkinson and Polly Atkinson for themselves,
and as guardians ad litem for Chad Atkinson, respectfully submit
appellant's brief.
I.
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
Parties to this proceeding are as follows:
Roger Atkinson

Plaintiff/Appellant

Polly Atkinson

Plai ntiff/Appellant

Chad Atkinson

Plaintiff/AppelJ ant

IHC Hospitals, Inc. aka
Intermountain Health Care
Hospitals, Inc.

Defendant/Respondent

Scott Wetzel Services, Inc.

Defendant/Respondent

Scott Olsen

Defendant/Respondent

Stephen G. Morgan

Defendant/Respondent

Morgan, Scalley & Reading

Defendant/Respondent

Primary Children's Hospital,
a hospital operated by
Intermountain Health Care
Hospitals, Inc.

Defendant/Respondent
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IV.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3)(j) and Artie]e VIII
Section 3 of the Utah Constitution.

V.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellants (Atkinsons) sued the defendants Stephen G.
Morgan (Morgan), and Morgan, Scalley & Reading for legal
malpractice which caused the appellants to accept an unfair
settlement agreement for their brain-damaged son.

Atkinsons

sued defendants IHC Hospitals, Inc. (IHC) and its settlement
agent Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. (Wetzel) and Wetzel's
employees, and Scott Olsen (Olsen) for fraud and for negligent
misrepresentation.

Atkinsons also sought a declaratory judgment

to construe the parties' settlement agreement as requiring IHC to
pay for therapy and custodial care costs.

Appellants also asked

the Court to declare the validity of a tacked on note to the
settlement agreement which may prohibit Atkinsons from suing
other tortfeasors without IHC's consent.

(R. 2-19)

This is an appeal from two J owe]* court orders grant inu
summary judgment to all defendants and denying Atkinsons' nmtion
to amend the complaint.

(R. 430-432, 390-393, 607-G09.)

1

VI.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR.REVIEW
The issues presented for review are:
1.

Whether attorney Morgan had a duty to Atkinsons and

whether Morgan breached that duty.
2.

Whether a release induced by fraud bars appellants'

subsequent claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation;
3.

Whether a probate court approved settlement agreement

collaterally estops plaintiffs from bringing subsequent claims
for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
4.

Whether the applicable statute of limitation bars

plaintiffs' claims against IHC, their independent insurance
adjuster, and the insurance adjuster's employee.
5.

Whether the Court erred in granting summary judgment

dismissing appellants' claims for declaratory relief.
6.

Whether the court abused its discretion in denying

plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint.
VII.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3

(1953)

Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4

(1953)

Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3(29)

(1953)

Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3(30)

(1953)

Utah Code Ann. §78-26-(3)

(3953)

Utah Const. Art. I §11
Utah Const. Art. I §24
U.S. Const. Amend XIV
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15
The text of the constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are set forth in the addendum of this brief.

VIII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Chad Atkinson, a minor suffered permanent and extreme brain
damage while a patient at Primary Children's Medical Center.
Primary Children's Medical Center is a facility owned by JHC.
Within 4 months of Chad's accident the Atkinsons entered into an
inadequate settlement agreement with IHC.

Atkinsons were

represented by Stephen G. Morgan of Morgan, Scalley & Reading.
Morgan did not disclose to the Atkinsons that he was also
representing IHC.
The Atkinsons brought this action against Stephen G. Morgan
and his law firm for legal malpractice.

The Atkinsons also sued

IHC, its claims adjuster, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and
Wetzel's employee, Scott Olsen for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation.

These defendants misrepresented to the

Atkinsons the condition of their baby Chad.
The Atkinsons also sought a declaratory judgment t'> construe
the settlement agreement as requiring IHC to pay for therapy and
institutional and custodial living costs incurred by the
3

Atkinsons in caring for Chad.

The Atkinsons also asked the

Court to enter an order declaring whether the Atkinsons must
obtain permission from defendant IHC prior to bringing an action
against other tortfeasors.
The lower court granted each and every defendant's motion
for summary judgment and denied appellants' motion to amend tlieir
complaint to allow a claim for medical malpractice.
IX.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Roger and Polly Atkinson are the parents and guardians

ad litem of Chad Atkinson. (R. 4, 12, 20-23, 77; 644, pp. 4, 12;
R. 647, pp. 4, 177.)
2.

At the time of the settlement agreement, Polly

Atkinson was 16 years old.

Neither Roger or Polly had progressed

beyond the 10th grade and neither are high school graduates.

(R.

644, pp. 4,5; 647 pp. 4,6.)
3.

IHC is a health care provider and the owner and

operator of Primary Children's Medical Center.
4.

Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. is the contract insurance

adjuster for IHC.
5.
Inc.

(R. 2, 40.)

(R. 2, 40)

Scott Olsen, is an employee of Scott Wetzel Services,

(R. 2, 40)
6.

Morgan, Scalley & Reading is a law firm in Salt Lake

City, Utah.
7.

(R. 2, 68)

Stephen G. Morgan is an officer and shareholder in

Morgan, Scalley & Reading.

(R. 2, 68)
4

8.

Chad Atkinson was born on March 2, 1983.

Later, while

a patient at IHC's Primary Children's Medical Center, Chad
aspirated filling his lungs with digestive material.

Previously,

the hospital nurse shut off the machine's warning device
monitoring Chad.

Chad was deprived of oxygen, causing him to

suffer extensive and permanent brain damage.

(R. 645, p. 7,

13; R. 647, p. 105.)
9.

After the injury of Chad Atkinson, the doctors at

Primary Children's Hospital misrepresented Chad's condition to
the parents.

They told the Atkinsons their child would be normal

and healthy.

(R. 645, pp. 28, 29; R. 647, pp. 17, 18, 31, 33,

38. )
10.

Within a few days after Chad was discharged from the

hospital, IHC contacted the Atkinsons asking them to come in for
a visit.
11.

(R. 653, pp. 19-26.)
The parents thought Wetzel was demanding payment for

the hospital bill.
12.

(R. 644. pp. 35, 39, 85, 86.)

At Wetzel's request, the Atkinsons met with Scott

Olsen, the manager of Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. four or five
times.
13.

(R. 653, p. 5, 269-270.)
Scott Olsen also misrepresented Chad's condition to the

parents.

He told the Atkinsons their child would be normal and

healthy.

(R. 647, pp. 45, 53, 54; 644, pp. 75, 108, 10«.)

14.

After Roger met with Olsen four or five times, olsen

presented to Roger what Roger understood to be as Primary
Children's Hospital's final offer.
5

(R. 644, pp. 83, 84.)

15.

Roger and Polly asked Olsen about seeing an attorney to

advise them regarding the offer.
16.

(R. 653, p. 48.)

Olsen recommended Steve Morgan, because Morgan was not

the attorney for IHC, and Olsen believed that Morgan would be
concerned for the Atkinsons.

Polly and Roger Atkinson consulted

with Morgan because he was recommended by Olsen.

(R. 65 3, pp.

49, 50.)
17.

At the time of the consultation, IHC's attorneys were

Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell.

However, Morgan was the attorney

for Scott Wetzel Services, the negotiating agent for IHC, a fact
not disclosed by Olsen or Morgan.

Thereafter, Roger and Polly

met with Morgan prior to having the court appoint them as
conservators for Chad Atkinson.
18.

(R. 332-335.)

Morgan only read portions of the documents and failed

to explain the documents to them.
19.

(R. 332-335.)

Further, Morgan never allowed Roger and Polly to

examine the pleadings and court papers until after the court had
approved the settlement and it was made final.

Therefore, the

plaintiffs were not given the opportunity to find out for
themselves that Morgan represented IHC.
20.

(R. 332-335.)

Morgan did not investigate the facts of the underlying

settlement.
21.

Morgan did not tell the Atkinsons he represented Scott

Wetzel Services or IHC.
22.

(R. 332-335.)

Morgan did not advise the Atkinsons that they shouJd

6

seek another attorney because he represented Scott Wetzel
Services and IHC.
23.

(R. 332-335.)

Morgan represented to Roger and Polly that the

settlement would not be approved by the court unless it was fair.
(R. 652, p. 33.)
24.

At Court, Morgan entered his appearance on the record

as attorney for Roger and Polly Atkinson.
25.

(R. 332-335.)

When Probate Court Judge Fishier asked whether Roger

and Polly had seen an attorney, they replied yes, because they
had seen Stephen Morgan.
26.

(R.332-335.)

During all these proceedings, Roger and Polly beJieved

that Morgan was their attorney.

(R. 332-335; 647, p. 83, 84,

117, 118, 126, 127.)
27.

Morgan later obtained Roger and Polly's signatures to

the settlement documents as revised by Morgan and his law firm.
28.

Morgan made changes in the settlement four days after

the court hearing.
29.

(R. 334.)

If the Atkinsons had known that Morgan represented

Scott Wetzel Services or the health care providers, they would
have sought other counsel, and not executed the settlement
documents.
30.

(R. 334.)
The settlement documents presented by IHC had a then

present-day value of $118,000.
31.

(R. 653, p. 78.)

The injuries sustained by Chad Atkinson are at least

$3,000,000.
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32.

As a result of the defendants' misrepresentations and

the conduct of attorney Stephen G. Morgan, the plaintiffs
misunderstood the condition of their child and the value of the
settlement agreement.
offer.

They consequently accepted the inadequate

(R. 334.)

33.

Polly and Roger Atkinson did not realize that Chad was

not going to be a normal child until he was a little over three
years old.
34.

(R. 644, 647.)
The Court granted IHC, Wetzel, and Olsen's Motions for

summary judgment, not because there were not any factual issues,
but because the judge believed either (1) the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, and/or (2) the settlement agreement, and/or
(3) the statute of limitations barred Atkinsons claims.

(R. 267-

278, 52-58, 590-593, 655.)
X
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
A FACT ISSUE EXISTS AS TO WHETHER
MORGAN HAD A DUTY TO ATKINSONS; AND WHETHER
MORGAN'S CONDUCT BREACHED THAT DUTY.
The record factually establishes that attorney Morgan had a
duty to the Atkinsons.
attorney.

Atkinsons believed Morgan was their

Morgan told them ho was their attorney.

sought and received legal advice from Morgan.

Atkinsons

Further, in Court

and on the record, Morgan stated that he represented "them".
109-195.)

8

(R.

There are numerous legal theories which support the idea
that Attorney Morgan had a duty to the Atkinsons.

Morgan could

be liable under theories of (1) express contract; (2) implied
contract; (3) limited attorney/client relationship; (4) third
party liability; or (5) volunteering legal advice.
POINT TWO
MORGAN'S CONDUCT WAS BELOW THE
STANDARD OF CARE.
Morgan's conduct in

assisting the Atkinsons in obtaining

court approval of an inadequate settlement agreement was below
the standard of care required of experienced attorneys.
For example, Morgan effectively told the Atkinsons that the
Judge could not approve the settlement agreement unless it was
fair.

That advice was hogwash.

Second, Morgan represented that

the settlement agreement was fair when the agreement clearly was
inadequate.

Third, Morgan failed to advise Atkinsons against

settling their claims,
known.

until the extent of Chad's injuries were

Fourth, Morgan failed to disclose to the Atkinsons that

he also represented Wetzel and IHC.
POINT THREE
OTHER ARGUMENTS RAISED BY MORGAN
IN THE TRIAL COURT ARE WITHOUT MERIT.
Morgan argued that his malpractice did not cause Atkinsons'
injuries.

The record is counter to Morgan's assertions.

Thp

Atkinsons testified that they had not accepted the settlement
proposed prior to seeing Morgan.
lawyer."

"That's why we went to see a

(R. 64, p. 90.)
9

Morgan, IHC, Wetzel and Olsen also claimed that Atkinsons
have only two alternatives:
the agreement.

to rescind the agreement or affirm

The law states otherwise.

The Atkinsons have the

right to rescind the agreement or sue for damages.

They chose to

sue for damages.
POINT FOUR
ANY DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE SHOULD RE
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ATKINSONS' RIGHT TO SET
ASIDE THE ORIGINAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.
To this point in the litigation, the Atkinsons have not pled
to vacate or rescind the original agreement.

However, because

the probate court abandoned its duty to evaluate the fairness of
the settlement, the settlement may be vacated, if Atkinsons
choose to do so.

Centala v. Navrude, 186 N.W.2d 35 (Mich.App.

1971) .
POINT FIVE
IHC, WETZEL AND OLSEN MISREPRESENTED
THE CONDITION OF CHAD ATKINSON TO THE PARENTS.
The record establishes that IHC, Wetzel and Olsen also
represented to the Atkinsons that the baby was "okay", "doing
well", "should be fine when we took him home, was at an age
fashionable level. . . progressing like a normal baby", that
Atkinsons "would be getting free money."
The Atkinsons believed IHC, Wetzel and Olsen and accepted
the inadequate settlement agreement.
representations were false.

Further, the

"They told me my son was going to

end up being a normal child. . . My child don't talk, don't walk,
don't crawl.

He just lays there.
10

(R. 644, p. 108.)

POINT SIX
THE RELEASE SIGNED BY THE A T K I N S O N S
DOES N O T BAR A T K I N S O N S ' CLAIMS A G A I N S T
IHC OR IHC'S CONTRACT A D J U S T E R S .
T n arpopting -the i nadequate settlement agreement
Atkinsons signed a release.

f

t he

However, the release does not bar

a i in s b e c a \ 1 s e i

A t k I •: - - • s ••

rhe release does not apply to IHC's Contractors Wetzel
and O i sen r
,

'

i';.'J.~'

:i

-

1 •

*

•

'

Chad's accident, not ••iaims -M frau-j a:i; negligent
misrepresentation:

^-j

i e 1 e a s e i i idi 1ced lb;> f i: ai 1 :1 3n : n t:i srepresentation does
p'

bar anything.
POINT SEVEN
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT
BAR A T K I N S O N S ' CLAIMS FOR FRAUD AND
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION.
Co] 1 atei: a] est oppe 1 does i Iot: bar A. 1: k :i nsons

r

c 1 a i ins f o r f r a u d

-i*~ J n^«jj] iq-M^ misrepresentation b e c a u s e :
• - 1 lateral estoppel never applies to decisions or
. J ;u
(2)

B :i i ipoi I sett] ernei it agr* ''-m*- -*' i .
Further, the elements necessary for collateral

are not present
There is iic £ -•

;- *iiu- case.

estoppel

The issues are not identical.

•.•.< M-Mit on the merits and the probate

proceeding did not invite litigation.
POINT EIGHT
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT B A R
ATKINSONS' CLAIMS.
11

The medical malpractice statute of limitations does not bar
Atkinsons' claims for several reasons:
First, the statute applies only to health care providers.
Wetzel and Olsen are not health care providers.
Second, the statute applies only to medical malpractice
claims.

Atkinsons' claims are for fraud and negligent

misrepresentation.
Third, Atkinsons brought their claim within 2 years of
discovery of the malpractice.
Further, if the medical malpractice statute of limitations
is applied to Atkinsons' claims, the statute is unconstitutional
and Chad would be denied his rights to equal protection and
access to the Courts guaranteed by Article I Section 11, and 24
of the Utah Constitution.
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3) does not bar Atkinsons' claims
because Atkinsons brought the action well within 3 years after
learning the facts of the fraud.
POINT NINE
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ATKINSONS'
CLAIMS FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.
The settlement agreement entered into between the Atkinsons
is ambiguous and contradictory.

It is ambiguous because it

doesn't say whether IHC must pay (]) costs of
institutionalization, (2) custodial care costs, and (3) all
therapy costs.

12

jf- j ? rontrad, ..i,iy oecause in one par-j JL-if. h

i. . :

Atkinsons to -M<- all tortfeasors other t har I Ht . while n
\. i : r M

•

'v i! i^ut I Hi

• sons from s u m g other

t

tortfeasors

.- consent.

Atkins -MS askpd the Con:*
-i-

another

+

: interpret the contract 1 O

» •

• i * • *

pr ^h ib 11 ; n j -v k i ns^i
Court lariea l^

"

-

t

i! " a - i '

• |

: J * ;«' suing othet lurt.Leasors is valid.

JL> either.
POINT TEN

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
lt:,l<.> i ATKINSONS' MOTION T:'j AMEND THEIR COMPI .All IT.
Atkins Tis sough' * ^ m
* *
:5

.-i - i. '

Lwugiit

^ • i create m v un*;s>
• 1 1 .-<

j• i

• *• T !>••!?• complaint by adding a claim
m e mution was not frivo! ^ -.

Further,

*i : ^^T-*-^, and no one argued tr.e amendment
-j • ouv*t abused its

r;< : ,
'

IP" 11 i i ii)

I i i

H I M

' in |

i

i | , j | I) i

XI
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE

HAD
A.

A FACT ISSUE EXISTS AS TO WHETHER MORGAN
\ DUTY TO ATKINSONS; AND WHETHER MORGAN'S ' N5
BREACHED THAT DUTY.

;

"n

Introduc t ion.
Morgan represented Atkinsons during probate hearings to

settle a medical malpractice action.
was negligent
B.

Atkinsons claim that Morgan

(See generally Statement of E"acts section above.)

Factual Basis for the Duty.
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The

The following facts support a finding that Morgan was
negligent:
Q:

[To insurance adjuster]
What happened next?

A:

I told them [Atkinsons] that they would
have to have an attorney finalize this
with the Court.

Q:

[To insurance adjuster]
What did they say? What did Roger
or Polly say?

A:

They asked if I knew of an
attorney.

Q:

[To insurance adjuster]
And then what did you say?

A:

I said, "Yes, I do know of an
attorney that you could use, but
you' re free to get whomever you
want. But I know of one."

Q:

[To insurance adjuster]
Then what happened?

A:

[T]hey asked who the attorney was
that they didn't want to go to all
the trouble of finding an attorney
to do this, and so they asked me to
get the attorney, (emphasis
added.)

Q:

[To insurance adjuster]
What did they say?

A:

Specifically, I don't remember,
but it was generally, "How can we
get a hold of him," or such. And
I said, "He or his office will
contact you. i will talk to him
and he or his office will contact
you. "

(R. 653; pp. 48:14 to 49:13.

Q:

[To insurance adjuster]
14

Why did you recommend Steve
Morgan?
[T]he second reason is because I
have dealt with Steve in the past,
and find him completely, one
hundred percent honest, and I knew
he would be concerned about the
Atkinsons. (emphasis added.)
(R

6 5 3f p

'

i

*

* * *

[to Polly Atkinson]
Tell me again your understanding
of how you came to see -:
Morgan.
[ T ] hey to 1 d us I. hey wuuid g<- * •:
lawyer and have him go over
[ settlement document? ] w i t.h
(R. 647 p. 83:13-18.
*

(h

*

*

*

Q:

rTo Polly Atkinson]
Now tell me what was said ana
whom in this meeting with Mr.
Morgan,

A:

We] 1 , we went i n and we sat down
and he told us he was here to help
us and go over the things. He told
us he was here to represent us and
help us wi th i t and go over the
different things, try and explain
the best he could what it meant to
us and that.
•

•;

J.)
4*

-A.

4-

4-

[To Polly Atkinson]
Now, when you went to Mr. Morgan I
think you said you felt like he
was representing you?
:

11 e t : • J :i i I s 1 i e \ i a s r e p r e s <
15

(R. 647, p. 117:20-22.)

Q:

[To Polly Atkinson]
You thought he [Morgan] could
fairly assess the two disputed
sides of the claim?

A:

I don't know. They told me they
would set us up with a lawyer,
okay? He [Morgan] told us that he
was there to help us and represent
us in this•

(R. 647, p. 118-)

Q:

[To Roger Atkinson]
You didn't ever ask him if this is
a good or bad deal, isn't that
true?

A:

I think not.
him that.

Q:

[To Roger Atkinson]
What did he say?

A:

I don't recall. I think he asked
us back if we thought it was
fair. 1

I think I did ask

(R. 644, p. 118:13 - 119:1. )
* * * *

Q:

[To Roger Atkinson]

^Assuming, arguendo, that there was no attorney-client
relationship, Morgan could not evade this question. When faced
with a specific question, Morgan had a duty to advise Atkinson
to seek independent legal advice. (Affidavit of C. Richard
Henriksen, at para. 3; R. 235-238.)
16

Tell us what was said anu i
in that meeting [the first
mee t i n u ] wit.Ii Mr. Mo r gan .
A;

We

We I 'J

iHtt'jdU' B(J

t<l

f l i Hi

do

SleVH

Morgan, He sai-j h^ was -ur lawyer
and w ;s to represent

•

Q:

•

•

*

[To Polly Atkinson]
You didn't "tell him. yni . I i < 111 ' I
understand it?
1 felt real reassured.
I le was i li ce
to us and we trusted him.

,

V

1 ''•• )

|To Morgan]
Okay, What was said by U le Atkinsons ai id
yourself?
[I] recall j.-;au x .
t : :- - .
,L ve
:igot those documents <jnd I ^ m : d i J Ke to have
you come in and sit down and I would like to
go over them with you. And so after that
initial conversation that I told you about we
went into either my office or the conference
room and I sat down and went over in detail
each of the documents and reac I them, and
explained them to Atkinsons.
(emphasis added )
pp, 15:2 4-25; 16:6 -8; 1 7:24-25-

Ifl?1 -3. )

[To Morgan]
And this explanation took about how long?
I.,-,,-

i .,

r n i h < -li r .

*

* * *
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Q:

[To Morgan]
Go ahead.

A:

I took the opportunity to. . . answer any
questions with regard to the documents that
they may have had.

(R. 652, pp. 19:23 and 20:8-11.)
•

*

*

*

Q:

[To Morgan]
Do you have any specific recollection what
you said about the Petition?

A:

So I attempted to explain to them these
payments and what guaranteed meant and how
these figures were arrived at. . . And I also
explained how the total payouts to Chad and
his parents, should Chad live a normal
lifetime, of $1,280,000 was arrived at.
Next document that I explained to them was
the order approving settlement of a minor's
claim. . . I read that document to them and
explained to them that' in order for the Court
to approve and sign this order that the Court
would have to find that it was in all
respects fair.
(emphasis added.)

(R. 652, pp. 20:17-18; 22:22-24; 25:20-22; 33:16-19.)
k

-k

-k "k

THE COURT: This is P-83-692, in the Matter
of Chad Atkinson, a minor.
MR. MORGAN: Steve Morgan representing them,
(emphasis added.). . .
THE COURT: Have you sought the advice of legal
counsel in this matter?
MRS. ATKINSON: I have talked to someone about it
but we are not planning on getting a lawyer.
THE COURT:

Have you talked to a lawyer?

MRS. ATKINSON: Yes. I've just asked him a few
things about it, and he said that we should really
18

n o t - - we shouldn't 1 i a <> e t o s \ i e t: 1: 1 e n; t i f 1:1 i. • a y a i: e
giving us an offer,
(R. 189-195, Transcript of Hearing, : 4.3>, .,uLy _., L 983
(attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum iM uppusition to Defendant
Morgan's Motion for Summary Judgmen*

Q:

Polly Atkinson]
m trying to find out; w ^ r went on
at the heariiiM
•
'. !iere. I
need to know wh.jt this transcript
means. Then he [the Court] said:
"Have you got any legal counsel in
this matter?" Then you said:
"I've talked to someone about it
) at we're not planning on getting a
lawyer, " H-i-e I read that right?

: Polly Atkinsoii |
iuu didn't say you talked t. i Mr,
Morga- f • < «J«-' advice, did /»u?
A:

0?

[To Polly Atkinson]
And he was there?

*•

Yes.
• '•< d ! y At k i nsoi: ]

The Court didn't ask him any
questions about it , is that ti: i m?
A:

That's the only question the judge
asked me about it, you know. I
thought the judge knew he was my
1awye r, I'm sorry.

Q:

["' r < :> P o ] ] y A t k i nson]
If the judge asked you that and
you said you weren't planning on
getting one, why did you say that?
Because they set us up with a
lawyer. We already had a lawyer.

(R

<

J

)
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* * * *

Q:

[To Roger Atkinson]
Did you ask the judge if he
thought it was okay?

A:

No, I thought that's what a judge
was for. To make sure you got
fair—whatever it's called—
settlement or so forth. I thought
that's why you have to go to a
judge.

Q:

[To Roger Atkinson]
You figured if he didn't think itwas okayf he'd tell you not to do
it?

A:

I figured that much, yes.

(R. 644, p. 120:16-24.)
•

*

*

*

July 28, 1984:
Steve Walkenhorst [from Morgan's
office] met with Mr. and Mrs.
Atkinson and received from them an
itemized list of the expenditures
made by the Atkinsons for the
benefit of Chad, during the first
year following court approval of
the settlement. Mr. and Mrs.
Atkinson explained many of the
itemized expenses during the
meeting. . .
July 30, 1984:
Steven Walkenhorst [from Morgan's
office] called Scott Olsen [Scott
Wetzel Services, Inc.] to ask if
Intermountain Health Care would pay
an attorney to assist the
Atkinsons in filing the annual
accounting. Scott said that it
would. Steve Walkenhorst called
Mr. Atkinson to tell him that an
attorney would be paid to prepare
the annual accounting. . .Mr.
Atkinson was agreeable to have the
annual accounting done this way.
20

(Defendant Morgan's Answers \-.- Plaintiti s First 6^1
Interrogatories, November 24, 1987..;.

ot

There are numerous theoi ies under wl i I« ::.! I ai I attorney may have
a duty to another.

'•

Mallet- :

^-. •'»•

:l

§§5 ] 7 1 3 (

Legal Malpractice,

' "!,,or ies tl lat apply in this

case are as L o i1ows:
1.

Implied Contract.
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o2

necessary.

h^ !'"iirt si iouJ d 1 ook to the words ~uid actions of the

n: r\e: Fetrie, supra; Hashemi v. Shack, 609 F.Supp.

39] , 393 (S ' M v

19 34) .

Where the evidence is in conflict as to whether there is an
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attorney/client relationship, the fact finder must resolve
factual disputes.
2.

Meehan v. Hopps, 301 P.2d 10 (Cal.App. 1956).

Limited Attorney-Client Relationship.2
Morgan argued below, that he was employed for a

limited purpose (to present the settlement papers to the Court)
and that the limited purpose was satisfied.

Assuming, arguendo,

that Morgan was hired for a limited purpose, Morgan still had a
duty to advise Atkinsons that they needed additional legal
services and that Morgan would not be providing the services.
Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 17 (Ky.App. 1978):
An attorney cannot completely disregard
matters coming to his attention which should
reasonably put him on notice that his client
may have legal problems or remedies not
precisely or totally within the scope of the
task being performed by the attorney.
3.

Third Party Liability.
Most courts find that an attorney can have a duty to

third parties even when there is no privity of contract.
cases, courts impose liability as a matter of policy.

In some

Lucas v.

Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961); Estate of Douglas, 428 N.Y.S.2d
558 (1980).

However, the predominant test is simply whether the

contracting parties (Morgan and IHC Hospitals) intended to
benefit the third party (Atkinsons).
Atkinsons.

If so, Morgan has a duty to

Formento v. Joyce, 522 N.E.2d 312 (Ill.App. 1988);

Angel, Cohen & Rogovin v. Oberon Investment, 512 So.2d 192 (Fla.
^Morgan must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the contract was for a limited purpose. Blake v. Blake, 412
P.2d 454, 456 (Utah 1966) .
22

i

"

. zu b i * *:y . iy 6 5; .

Flaherty v . Weinoerj

pdities intended to benef*f
Flaherty, supra.

Whether

.. . d party u> d fact issue

see generally, Lawyer Malpractice:

Duty

Relationships Bey ^ji=, . .niiait..,, '»

' • ;

Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties,

;26

(19 82) ; Am" * -r : • n, Attorney Liability to Other than Immediate
Client for Negligence in Connection with Lega J i;u. . »-• , • I
A „ L, R,4i h l" ." " f 1 9 8 H ) ,
4•

vuiunteej: .
E v e n i f there was no attorney/client relati onship,
J1 11*- volunteered legal advice to

Morgan can ;^e held iidi r-

(h t*

] '•"• • attorney gratis i * ous 1 \ explained ui'.jing

documents

M>

• --i- * -
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J!
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issue exists ^s t ;* whether Morgan had

* •- Atkinsons and whether he breached the duty.
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a legal basis for the duty under theories of (] ) implied
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There

POJNT TWO
MORGAN'S CONDUCT WAS BELOW THE STANDARD OF CARE
A.

Advice Regarding Role of the Judge.
Morgan testified that he "reviewed" with plaintiffs a

document titled "Order Appointing Conservator."

In the course

of reviewing that document, Morgan explained to plaintiffs that:
[I]n order for the Court to approve and sign
this Order that the Court would have to find
that the settlement was in all respects was
fair.
(R. 652, p. 33.)
Atkinsons believed and relied upon Morgan's advice:
Q:

[To Roger Atkinson]
Did you ask the Judge if he thought
it was okay [the settlement]?

A:

No, I thought that's what a judge
was for, to make sure you got fair
-- whatever it's called —
settlement or so forth. I thought
that's why you had to go to a
judge.

Q:

You figured if he didn't think it
was okay, he'd tell you not to do
it?

A:

I figured that much, yes.

(R. 644, p. 120.)
However, the judge could not make any conclusion about
the fairness of this settlement because Morgan did not give the
judge any facts about the underlying cause of action.
Hearing, July 22, 1983.)

(Tr.

In fact, in this case, the judge did

not even evaluate the underlying claim at all.
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(Deposition of

P h i ! i p H,
depo. a t _

-:..•_•:

; u • -

^compare Fishier dep'K

F i s l ) ] er "

-it ' :'Q-2rj.)

Finally, a settlement is ?:->t -p.iranteed to be M i r ~i.mpl/
because a judge approves it.

Centala v. Navrude,

(Mich.App. 1971) .
B•

Adv ice Regardii lg 11 le V a 1 ue o£ 11 le Set11 ernent.
Even though Morgan asserts that he was not Atkinson's

attorney, l«.- . \>rit rati i f1t ed t hut assertion when he testified tiut

example, Morgan says:
And in the course of reading the document to
the Atkinsons I wanted them to understand
what guaranteed meant, and that is why we
added the language, to clarify that
guaranteed payment meant that if Chad, should
die they, the parents, would stil1 receive
the payments. (emphasis added.)
*

•

•

•

*

1 a J so explained to them these various
figures and, for example, how $9Pfi n n 0 was
arrived at.
* * * *

So I attempted to explain to tl leni these
payments and what guaranteed meant and how
these figures were arrived at and I dicI
that.
* * * *

And I also explained how the total payouts
to Chad and his parents, should Chad live a
normal lifetime, of $1,280,000 was arrived
at
(iv. vj^r

pp. 21, 22, and 2 5.)
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Morgan's advice was incorrect.

The standard of

practice would have required the attorney to explain the concept
of "present value,"

(Affidavit of C. Richard Henriksen, Jr., R.

235-238.) .
Neither Roger (father) nor Polly (mother) ever
graduated from high school.^
Section of this brief.)
fortune to those kids.

(See generally Statement of Facts

The sum of $1,280,000 sounded like a
Without proper legal advice, they had no

way of knowing that the "present value" or cost of the $1,280,000
annuity was a mere $118,000.

(R. 653, p. 78.)

Compare this case with Nelson v. Nationwide Mortgage, 659
F.Supp. 611 (D.D.C. 1987).

In Nelson the attorney attended a

real estate closing and gave the impression that he was
representing all parties.
documents.

The attorney read and explained

The district court ruled that the attorney can be

held liable for negligence unless he can show that the reliance
was unreasonable or unforeseeable.
If plaintiffs had known the true facts, or if plaintiffs had
received correct legal advice, they would not have made the
settlement.
C.

(R. 332-336.)

Premature Settlement.
Atkinsons asked Morgan if the settlement was a "good

deal."

(R. 644, p. 118.)

Morgan did not give a direct response,

3EC 7-11 Utah Rules of Professional Responsibility ( In
effect at time of the occurrence) states: "The Responsibilities
of a lawyer may vary according to the intelligence, experience,
mental condition, or age of a client."
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rather Morgan asked Roger Atkinson, the father, if he thought it
was a good deal. 4

(R. 644, p. 119.)

Morgan also stated that the

court would "find that the settlement was in all respects fair"
before the order was signed.

(R. 652, p. 33.)

However, Morgan was always aware that, "nobody knew the
extent of the brain damage,"

(R. 652, p. 51.)

Any experienced

attorney would advise against any settlement until the extent of
the injuries was known.

If Atkinsons had received proper advice,

they would not have entered into the settlement.
D.

(R. 332-336.)

Morgan Failed to Advise Plaintiffs to Obtain Independent
Counsel.
Morgan contends he was employed by Intermountaln

Health Care to perform the necessary legal tasks of placing the
financial settlement agreement before the Third Judicial District
Court.

(R. 652, p. 15.)

If that was true,^ Morgan had an

absolute conflict of interest.

It was in the interest of

defendant IHC to pay Atkinsons as little as possible.

It was in

the interest of IHC to settle the case before the full extent of
the brain damage was known.

It was in the interest of the

Atkinsons to settle the case later, after the extent of the brain
damage was known.
4

Morgan's evasive response was below the standard of
care. (See Affidavit of Henriksen, at para. 2.) See also
Dauqherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 17 (Ky.App. 78).
J

Plaintiff vigorously contends that an attorney-client
relationship existed between the plaintiffs and defendant
Morgan. See Point B above.
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Faced with these circumstances, Morgan had a duty to
disclose his conflict of interest.

Further, Morgan had a duty to

advise the Atkinsons to obtain independent counsel.
Bishop, 686 P.2d 350 (Ore. 1984);
R. 235-238.)

In Re:

(see Affidavit of Henriksen,

See DR7-104 (A)(2) Utah Rules of Professional

Responsibility;"
During the course of his representation of a
client [IHC] a lawyer shall not: (2) Give
advice to a person who is not represented by
a lawyer, other than the advice to secure
counsel, if the interests of such person are
or have a reasonable possibility of being in
conflict with the interests of his client.
If Atkinsons had been advised of Morgan's conflict of
interest, they would have hired a separate attorney.

(Affidavit

of Roger Atkinson, R. 332-336. )
An independent attorney, observing the standard of
care, would have disclosed and explained his conflicts of
interest to the plaintiffs.
R. 235-238.)

(See Affidavit of Richard Henriksen,

See also Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1982).

POINT THREE
OTHER ARGUMENTS RAISED BY MORGAN
IN THE TRIAL COURT ARE WITHOUT MERIT
Morgan raised a flurry of arguments in the trial
court.

The trial court judge granted summary judgment without

6
The Rules were modified on January 1, 1988. The
citation above relates to the Rules in effect as of the date of
the occurrence.
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giving his reasons as required by U.R.C.P. 52(a).

Atkinsons will

treat, briefly, those issues which appear to lack any merit:
A.

Proximate Cause.
In the trial court, Morgan argued that there was no

proximate cause to connect Morgan's alleged malpractice and
damages.

(Memorandum in Support of Morgan's Motion for Summary

Judgment, R. 163-164.)

Morgan claims there was no proximate

cause because the parties finalized their settlement before
Morgan came on the scene.

Also, Morgan claims that he was hired

in a limited capacity to act as a schrivener.

(Morgan

memorandum, R. 164-169.)
Morgan's assertions are vigorously disputed by the
Atkinsons.

Atkinson testified that the agreement was not final

until after Morgan was hired:
Q:

[To Roger Atkinson]
Before you went to the fifth
meeting, had you and Polly decided
to accept Scott Wetzel's proposal?

A:

I don't think so in full, that's
why we went to see a lawyer.

Q:

Which lawyer?

A:

Steve Morgan.

(R. 64, p. 90.)
Moreover, the written contract, drafted by Morgan and
executed after Morgan was hired, specifically disclaims any prior
verbal agreements:
The undersigneds further declare and
represent that no promise, inducement or
agreement not herein expressed has been made
to the undersigned and that this release and
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assignment contains the entire agreement.
(Emphasis added.) (R. 16.)
In addition, there could be no agreement before Morgan
was hired.

Chad Atkinson was an infant.

The law requires that

there be no contract on behalf of an infant before court
approval.
B.

Utah Code Ann. §78-5-40 (1953).

Election of Remedies.
Morgan as well as IHC, Wetzel and Olsen, claim that

Atkinsons have only two alternatives:

(1) To rescind the

agreement or (2) to affirm the agreement.

Morgan argues that

Atkinsons have chosen to affirm the agreement; and therefore,
there is no cause of action against Morgan.

(R. 175, 176, 53,

54. )
In this case, Atkinsons seek damages caused by (1) the
health care providers' fraudulent and negligent conduct and by
(2) the negligent conduct of Steve Morgan.
any double recovery.
is inapplicable.

They are not seeking

Thus the doctrine of election of remedies

Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671

P.2d 772 (Utah 1983) •
If the Court construes Atkinsons pleading to raise an
election of remedies issue, it is for Atkinsons, not Morgan to
elect which remedy Atkinsons will pursue.
v. Saunders, 432 P.2d 37 (Utah 1967).

Midvale Motors, Tnc.

Furthermore, the Court

must protect the infant in making such an election:
[T]t is the right and duty of the Court, even
though it has appointed a representative for
the infant, to protect the rights and
interests of the infant party to litigation
on its own motion. The rule applies. . .
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whether or not the proper relief is asked in
the pleadings.
The Court is bound to notice substantial
irregularities even though objections are not
properly presented on the infant's behalf.
43 C.J.S., Infants §220 (1955).
Finally, a guardian ad litem cannot waive any substantial
rights of the infant.

In Re: Interest of Burbanks, 310 N.W.2d

138 (Neb. 1981).
POINT FOUR
ANY DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE SHOULD BE WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO ATKINSONS' RIGHT TO SET ASIDE THE
ORIGINAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.
To this point in the litigation, Atkinsons have not pled to
vacate the original settlement agreement.

Rather, Atkinsons seek

damages (See Point Three above.)
However, it is clear that the probate judge abandoned his
duty to protect the infant.

Indeed, the probate judge made

no evaluation of the substance of the settlement.7
(Fishier depo. at 51:21-23.)

Since the Court did not evaluate

the fairness of the settlement, the settlement may be vacated.

"[T]he Court. . . may authorize,
direct, or ratify any contract,
trust, or other transaction
relating to the protected person's
financial affairs or involving his
estate if the Court determines that
the transaction is in the best
interests of the protected person."
U.C.A. §75-5-409(2) (1953)
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Centala v. Navrude, 186 N.W.2d 35 (Mich.App. 1971); Decany v.
Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 89.)
Therefore, if Atkinsons' cause of action fails for any
reason, this Court should affirm the judgment below, but without
prejudice to Atkinsons' right to file a new claim to set aside
the settlement agreement.

(c.f. Centala, supra.)
POINT FIVE

IHC, WETZEL AND OLSEN MISREPRESENTED
THE CONDITION OF CHAD ATKINSON,
TO THE PARENTS.
A.

IHC Misrepresented the Medical Condition and Future of
Chad Atkinson.
After Chad was injured, Polly Atkinson, the mother,

asked about her child.
Q:

Tell me what the nurse said.

A:

She just said that Chad was doing
okay.

(R. 647 at p. 11.)
The mother also had numerous conversations with the IHC
doctors
Q:

Tell me what Dr. Matlak told you
about the seizure.

A:

He just told us that they had given
him phenobarbital to stop him from
having another seizure and got him
to the point where he was
comfortable again, wasn't having
any more. That was about it,

Q:

Did Dr. Matlak tell you anything
about the effect of that seizure. .
?

A:

No he didn't.
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(R. 647, pp. 17-18.)
Q:

DLd you have any conversations
about Chad's prognosis?

A:

Well, he kept telling me how good
he was doing and he was so happy he
was doing so well.

(R. 647, at p. 31.)
Q:

You said Dr. Matlak talked about
Chad, what did he say about Chad?

A:

[H]e said that Chad should be fine
when we took him home. . .

(R. 647, p. 33.)
A:

[Dr. Thompson] said that Chad
looked like he was doing really
well...

(R. 647, p. 38.)
The doctors also misrepresented Chad's condition to the
father.
A:

[D]r. Thompson said at one time
that he [Chad] was at an age
fashionable level where he was
progressing like a normal baby...

(R. 644, p. 30. )
A:

They [the doctors] said he looked
like he was doing fine.

Q:

Who said that?

A:

Dr. Matlak said he was ready to go
home.

(R. 644, p. 28.)
A:

[T]hey said he should grow up and
be normal
not be normal, but be
a healthy baby. This is what I
gathered in conversations with
them.
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(R. 644, at p. 29.)
B.

The Atkinsons Believed the Doctors.
When the Atkinsons took their child home from the hospital,

they believed Chad was healthy.
Q:

At the time you took Chad home from
the hospital in late April of 1983,
what was your understanding of
Chad's condition.

A:

Well he was doing really really
good. He looked real healthy.

(R. 647, p. 76.)
Q:

What did you understand at this
time his injury to be?

A:

From what we had gathered, he was
doing fine, had recovered just
fine.

(R. 644, p. 28.)
Q:

Did you think at that time he was
going to be normal?

A:

Yeah, from the way it looked, they
said he should grow up and be
normal - not be normal, but be a
healthy baby. This is from what I
gathered in conversations with
them.

(R. 644, p. 29. )
C.

Scott Olsen of Scott Wetzel Services, Inc.
Misrepresented Chad's Condition to the Parents.
Olsen misrepresented Chad's condition to the mother, Polly

Atkinson.
A:

[Olsen] mentioned how good Chad
looked. He was kind of telling us
that he thought Chad looked great,
he didn't look any worse for the
wear.
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(R. 647, p. 45.)
A:

They made it sound like everything
was going to be fine with him and
we were going to be getting this
[money] for nothing. . . that's
what Scott said at the final
meeting.

Q:

What did Scott say?

A:

How good Chad looked, this will be
really great, you'lL be able to do
what you want with the money. . .

A:

He said it would be like getting
money for nothing. He told us
that.

Q:

In those words?

A:

Yes.

A:

He said. . . everything was going
to be okay with him [Chad], he was
doing so good and he was getting
really well.

A:

[Olsen said] [t]he doctors had
said to him he thought Chad was
going to be fine.

(R. 647, pp. 53, 54.)
A:

[Scott Olsen said] Chad would be
well enough to where we wouldn't
have a case anymore.

(R. 647, p. 70.)
Olsen also misrepresented Chad's condition to the father
A:

Olsen said, [lit looked like Chad
was progressing pretty normally and
was looking good. . . and that we'd
be getting free money if anything
because Chad should grow up fairly
normal.

(R. 644, p. 75.)
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The Parents Believed IHC, Wetzel and Olsen and Accepted
the Inadequate Settlement Offer,
Q:

At the time you signed the
settlement agreement in July of
1983, what was your understanding
of Chad's condition?

A:

He was a baby. It looked like he
was progressing great. He was
doing fine.

644, p. 109.)
Q:

At that time what was your
understanding of Chad's condition?

A:

He was doing great.
really really well.

Q:

Did you understand that he was
brain damaged?

A:

No I didn't.

Q:

Did you understand that he would
have any kind of permanent
injuries?

A:

No.

Q:

Did you understand that he was
different from a normal baby in any
way?

A:

No.

He was doing

647, p. 73.)
The Representations were False.
A:

They told me my son was going to
end up being a normal child. My
child is four years old and still a
baby. My child don't talk, don't
walk, don't crawl. He just lays
there.

Q:

TeJ1 me who told you your child was
going to progress normally.

A:

Scott Olsen and the doctors.
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(R. 644, p. 108.)
POINT SIX
THE RELEASE SIGNED BY THE ATKINSONS
DOES NOT BAR ATKINSONS' CLAIMS AGAINST
IHC OR IHC'S CONTRACT ADJUSTERS.
A.

Introduction.

In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, IHC, Wetzel
and Olsen alleged that the Atkinson claims for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation were barred by the parties' signed
release. (R. 255, 256, 272.)
However, the release cannot support a summary judgment
because:
(1)

The release does not apply to IHC's contractors, Wetzel

and Olsen;
(2)

The release only applies to claims that result from the

Chad's accident; and
(3)

A release induced by fraud or misrepresentation does

not bar anything.
B.

The Release Does Not Apply to IHC's Independent
Contractor, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., nor to
Wetzel's Employee, Scott Olsen.
The release signed by the Atkinsons applies only to

"Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary
Children's Medical Center or their agents, servants, successors,
heirs, executors, [and] administrators." (R. 15.)
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Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. was not an agent, servant,
successor, heir or executor of IHC.

It was an independent

contractor,
Q:

What was your relationship with IHC at the
time of the first meeting with the
Atkinsons?

A:

[SJcott Wetzel Services had a contract to
investigate, adjust, negotiate, evaluate
claims that were assigned to us by the
various hospitals and Intermountain Health
Care,

(R. 653, p. 24.)

A copy of the contract is attached in the

addendum to this brief.
Scott Olsen was the claims manager for Scott Wetzel
Services, Inc.

He was an employee of Wetzel, not IHC. (R. 653,

pp. 4, 6, 29, 33.)

Therefore, the release does not apply to the

independent contractor, Wetzel nor Wetzel's employee, Scott
Olsen.
C.

The Release Does Not Apply to Atkinsons' Claims for
Fraud and Misrepresentation.
The release, on its face, applies only to "claims, actions,

causes of actions, demands, rights, damages, costs, . . .
resulting to or to result from the accident, casualty or event
which occurred on or about the 4th day of March, 1983 at the
Primary Children's Medical Center."

(R. 15.)

Atkinsons' claims are not claims for medical malpractice
resulting from the negligent care inflicted by IHC on Chad
Atkinson.

Rather, the claims are for fraud and misrepresentation

made by IHC's doctors, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott
Olsen after the accident.
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Two cases which hold that fraud is a separate claim distinct
from medical malpractice are Watts v. Cumberland Co. Hospital
System, Inc., 330 S.E.2d 242 (N.C.App. 1985) and Gaines v.
Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1987).

Because

Atkinsons' claims are separate and distinct from the accident
claims, the release does not apply to the Atkinsons claims.

Its

axiomatic that rights of action not expressly contained in a
release are not barred by the release.

e.g. Haco Drilling Co. v.

Hammer, 426 P.2d 689 (Okl. 1967).
D.

A Release Obtained by Fraud Does Not Bar Anything.
The Atkinsons' Complaint alleges that the settlement

agreement and release were induced by the fraud of IHC, Scott
Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen.
Releases induced by fraud or misrepresentation may be
avoided.
1941).

Kelly v. Salt Lake Transp. Co., 116 P.2d 383 (Utah
The release is not binding.

(Idaho 1940).

Estes v. Magee, 109 P.2d 631

When confronted with a settlement, the alternative

remedies are:
1.

Rescind the contract and sue for relief of
the consideration paid or parted with by the
plaintiff; or

2.

Retain the benefits of the agreement and sue
for damages.

Inman v. Merchant's Casualty Co., 27 App. Div. 320, 83 N.Y.S.2d
801 (N.Y. 1948); Estes v. Magee, 109 P.2d 631 (Idaho 1940);
Southern Railroad Co. v. James, 140 N.E. 556 (Ind. 1923).

In

this case, plaintiffs seek damages caused by (1) the health care
provider's fraudulent and negligent conduct and by (2) the
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fraudulent and negligent conduct of Scott Wetzel Services, Inc.
and its employee, Scott Olsen.
A case directly on point is Automobile Underwriters v. Rich,
53 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 1944).

In the Rich case, the plaintiff

sought damages caused by an inadequate settlement agreement
procured by fraud and misrepresentation.
The court, in discussing plaintiff's alternative remedies,
said:
(1)

He can. . • return whatever was received and
bring suit on the original right of action.
[or]

(2)

He can keep what he has received and file
suit against the ones perpetrating the fraud
and recover such amount as will make it an
honest one.

Id. at 777.
The Atkinsons, in this case chose remedy (2).
In summary, when a release is obtained by fraud or
misrepresentation, the release does not prohibit the plaintiff
from retaining the benefits of the settlement and suing those who
perpetrated the fraud for damages.

The release does not bar

Atkinsons' claims of fraud and misrepresentation against IHC,
Wetzel and Scott Olsen.
POINT SEVEN
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT BAR ATKTNSONS'
CLAIMS FOR FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION.
A.

Introduction.
In support of their motions for summary judgment, IHC, Scott

Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen asserted that collateral
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estoppel prohibits Atkinsons' claims for fraud and
misrepresentation. (R. 273-275.)
However, collateral estoppel never applies to decisions or
judgments based upon settlement agreements.

Further, three out

of the four required collateral estoppel elements are not present
in this case.

Therefore the doctrine of collateral estoppel does

not bar the Atkinsons' claims.
B.

Collateral Estoppel Never Applies to Decisions or
Judgments Based on Settlement Agreements.
Collateral estoppel "precludes relitigation only of issues

actually tried in a prior action. . . . " Robertson v. Campbell,
674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983).

Because parties settle for a myriad

of reasons not related to the resolution of the issues they are
litigating, collateral estoppel is not applied when the judgment
is based on a settlement agreement.

Krikava v. Webber, 716 P.2d

916 (Wash.App. 1986); Marquardt v. Federal Old Line Ins. Co., 658
P.2d 20 (Wash.App. 1983).
C.

All the Elements Necessary to Apply Collateral Estoppel
Do Not Exist in This Case.
Collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of issues that

have once been litigated.

It prevents parties from relitigating

facts and issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in
the first suit.

Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 247-48 (UtahApp.

1987); Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978).
The following four elements must be present before
collateral estoppel can be applied:
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1.

The issue decided in the prior adjudication
must be identical to the issue presented in
the subsequent litigation.

2.

There must be a final judgment on the merits.

3.

The party against whom the plea is asserted
must be a party or in privity with a party to
the prior adjudication,

4.

The issue in the first case must be
completely, fully and fairly litigated.

Searle Brothers, at 691; Berry, supra.
If any of these four elements is not satisfied, then summary
judgment, based on collateral estoppel, is not available.

Berry

supra at 24 8.
Three out of the four collateral estoppel elements are
missing in the present case.

First, the issues in this case are

not identical to the issues in the prior conservatorship
proceeding.
1.

The issues in the conservatorship proceeding were:

Should Scott Kelly's Petition for Conservatorship on

the part of the parents be granted?
2.

Is the settlement agreement, on its face, so

unreasonable that the conservators should not be authorized to
accept it?

(Fishier depo. at pp. 8, 10.)

In the present case, the issues are:
1.

Did IHC and/or Scott Olsen and/or Scott Wetzel

Services, Inc. fraudulently, or negligently misrepresent: (a)
Chad's condition; and/or (b) the value of the settlement?
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2.

If so, did the parents reasonably rely on the

misrepresentations?
3.

Were the parents and Chad damaged by the

misrepresentations?

e.g. Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293

(Utah 1980); Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666
P.2d 302 (Utah 1983).
The issues in the present case plainly are not identical to
the issues in the perfunctory conservatorship proceeding.
Second, there was not a judgment on the merits.

A judgment

not rendered on the merits may not be used as a basis for the
application of collateral estoppel.
(2d ed. 1969).
(1958).
consent.

46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments §477

See In Re; West Jordan, 7 U.2d 391, 326 P.2d 105

A judgment is not on the merits when it is obtained by
see Restatement (Second) Judgments §20.

Finally, the issues in the prior proceeding were not fully,
completely, or fairly litigated.
litigation, none.

In fact, there was no

No summons or complaint was ever filed or

served, no answer was ever filed.

Only one attorney appeared at

the conservatorship proceedings, held without notice, and he
apparently represented all of the parties.

"Mr. Morgan:

Morgan representing them" (Tr. July 22, 1983, p. 1.)

Steven

The

appointment of a conservator does not qualify as a full, fair and
complete litigation.

In fact, the judge approved the settlement

to avoid the "inherent risk of litigation." (Fishier depo., p.
50. )
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POINT EIGHT
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR ATKINSONS'
CLAIMS AGAINST IHC, SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC. AND
SCOTT OLSEN FOR FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION.
A,

Introduction.
IHC, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen also based

their summary judgment motions on the statute of limitations.
They argued that Atkinsons' claims for fraud and
misrepresentation were barred either by Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4,
the two year medical malpractice statute of limitations, or Utah
Code Ann. §78-12-26, the three year, after discovery of the
fraud, statute of limitations.

(R. 276-279.)

The statute of limitations defense is meritless for several
reasons.

First, Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 applies only to health

care providers, not Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen.
Second, Utah Code Ann.

§78-14-4 applies only to medical

malpractice claims, not to claims for fraud or negligent
misrepresentation.
Third, if Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 did bar Atkinsons' claims,
it would violate Article I, Section 11 and 24 of the Utah
Constitution.
Fourth, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3) does not bar plaintiffs'
claims because the parents did not learn of Chad's true condition
until he was over three years old.

They filed this action well

within three years after learning the facts of the fraud.
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B.

The Medical Malpractice Statute does not bar
Atkinsons' claims for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation against Scott Wetzel Services, Inc.
and Scott Olsen.
The 2-4 year medical malpractice statute of limitations

contained in Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 js not applicable to
Atkinsons' claims against Wetzel and Olsen.

The medical

malpractice statute applies only to actions "against a health
care provider."
[A] health care provider includes any person.
. . corporation. . . or institution who. . .
renders health care of professional services
as a hospital, physician, registered nurse,
[etc]. . . or agents of any of the above
acting in the course and scope of their
employment."
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3(1) (1953).
"Health Care" means:
fa]ny act or treatment performed or furnished
by. . . b y any health care provider for, to,
or on behalf of a patient during the
patient's medical care, treatment and
confinement,
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3(30) (1953).
Wetzel and Olsen are not health care providers because they
did not furnish health care to the Atkinsons.

They did not

medically treat the Atkinsons and Atkinsons were not Wetzel's
nor Olseirs patients.

Further Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and

Scott Olsen were not agents of the health care provider, IHC.
They were independent contractors for purposes of claims
adjusting.

See Point Five of this brief.. Further, Atkinsons

claims against Wetzel and Olsen did not arise out of any provider!
45

health care.

They arose out of Wetzel's and Olsen's

misrepresentations as to the value of the settlement and the
condition and future of the Atkinsons' child.
For these reasons, the medical malpractice statute of
limitations simply and unequivocally does not apply to Atkinsons'
claims against Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen.
C.

The
Medical
Malpractice
Statute
does
not
bar
At ki ns ons ' c l a i m s
for
fraud
and
neglig ent
misrepresentation against IHC. Atkinsons are not suing
IHC for medical malpractice.
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 applies only to claims for medical

malpractice.

The medical malpractice statute reads in part:

No medical malpractice
health
care
provider
unless ..." Id.

action against a
may
be
brought

Utah Code Ann., §78-14-4 (1953).
Malpractice action. . . means, any action
against a health care provider, based upon
personal injuries related to or arising out
of health care rendered or which should have
been rendered. . . (emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3 (29) (1953).
Health care means any act or treatment
performed or furnished or which should have
been performed or furnished by any health
care provider for, to, or on behalf of a
patient during the patient's medical care,
treatment or confinement.
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3 (30)(1953)
Atkinsons' claims against IHC are not based upon a personal
injury arising out of health care provided.

Atkinsons' claims

arise out of IHC's misrepresentations as to the fairness of the
settlement and the condition and future of plaintiffs' child.
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Fraud and misrepresentation claims are separate and distinct
claims

from

medical

malpractice

claims.

Gains

v.

Preterm-

Cleveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1987); Watts v. Cumberland
County Hospital

System,

Inc., 330 S.E.2d 242

(N.C.App.

1985).

Because the fraud and misrepresentation claims are separate and
distinct

from medical malpractice claims, they are governed by

the Fraud Statute of Limitations and not the Medical Malpractice
Statute of Limitations.

Id.

The foregoing is consistent with Utah case law holding that
when there is doubt as to which statute of limitations applies,
the statute providing
preferred.

the longest period

in which to

file is

Juab County Dept. of Public Welfare v. Summers, 426

P.2d 1 (Utah 1967) .
However, in this case there isn't any doubt.

Atkinsons'

claims are garden variety fraud and negligent misrepresentation
claims.

They are not medical malpractice claims.

malpractice

statute

of

limitations

does

not

bar

The medical
Atkinsons'

claims.
D.

If the Medical Malpractice Statute did bar Chad
Atkinson's claim, the Statute would violate Article I
Sections 11 and 24 of the Utah Constitution.
1.

The

medical

malpractice

statute

of

limitations,

if

applied, violates Article I Sect. 11 (Open Courts) of the Utah
Constitution.
Article I Section 11 of Utah's Constitution guarantees open
access to the courts:
All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him. . . shall have
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remedy by due course of law. . . and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting. . .
any civil cause to which he is a party.
The Utah Medical Malpractice Statute, unlike Utah's other
statutes of limitation has no tolling, provision for minors.

Its

effect, like a statute of repose, is to cut off a minor's claim
before the minor can discover his claim.
In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985),
the Utah Supreme Court invalidated the Utah Products Liability
statute of repose.

The Court said that the statute violated the

open courts provision of Utah's Constitution.
not bar all claims outright.

The statute did

Rather, it only barred claims which

arose a certain number of years after the injuring product was
manufactured

or sold.

The Supreme Court quoted with

approval

Heath v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 464 A.2d 288, 294 (N.H. 1983), to
the effect that the Utah Open Courts provision contemplates that
plaintiffs
accrued,

will
in

have

which

to

a

sufficient

file.

time,

Berry,

at

after

a

673-74.

claim
The

has

court,

therefore, broadly declared the statute unconstitutional because
the plaintiff

was

"arbitrarily

deprived

of

effective

designed to protect basic individual rights."

remedies

Jd. at 675.

The Utah Medical Malpractice anti-tolling statute deprives
Chad Atkinson and all other similarly situated children of the
effective
rights.

remedies

designed

to

protect

their

basic

individual

Within the statutory limitation period, Chad Atkinson

did not have

sufficient

malpractice claim.

understanding

to discover

his medical

Further, without a guardian, he was legally
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incompetent to enforce any of his legal rights in a Utah court.
U.R.C.P. 17.
The protection of Chad's legal rights were left exclusively
within

the

hands

of

his parents.

However, many

courts

have

recognized that minors' rights often go unprotected due to the
inadequacies of their parents or guardians.

See, e.g., Scott v.

School Board of Granite School District, 568 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah
1977); Barrio v. San Manuel Division Hospital, 692 P.2d 280, 29596 (Ariz. 1984); and Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex.
1983) .
In states where an open court clause is interpreted to be
more than a mere statement of philosophy, repose and anti-tolling
provisions

like

invalidated.

those
Sax

v.

in

Utah's

Votteler,

Division Hospital, supra.

Medical
supra;

Malpractice
Barrio

v.

Act

San

are

Manuel

These cases hold that such provisions

unreasonably deprive minors of an effective remedy.
Unlike adults which are granted some discovery period, Chad
had

no

claim.

real

opportunity

to

discover

his

medical

malpractice

Even if he could comprehend his claim, he could not turn

the key to the courthouse door without an adult acting for him.
Chad's

"effective

remedies"

would

be

taken

from

him

by

Medical Malpractice Act's anti-tolling and repose clauses.
Utah Open Courts provision would therefor be vioLated

the
The

it Utah

Code Ann. §78-14-4 is applied to Chad's claims.
2.

If the medical malpractice statute of limitations
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is

applied,

it

violates

the

child's

right

to

uniform

and

equal

protection of the law.
Further, if the Medical Malpractice Statute is construed to
bar Chad Atkinsons' claims, then Chad Atkinson would be denied
his right to uniform and equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by Article

I Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and the 14th

Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The right to bring a tort claim is an "important substantive
right".

Condemarin v. University Hospital, 107 Utah Adv.Rptr. 5

(1989).

In Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) this Court

defined
avoid

the minimal
an

equal

classification

level of

protection
must

scrutiny

a statute must pass to

violation.

reasonably

promote

Malan

held

legitimate

that

the

legislative

objectives (I_d. at 670). Malan further held that classifications
would

be

expressly

subject
stated

to
that

a

degree

it

of

judicial

scrutiny.

is unconstitutional

Malan

to single out a

group of plaintiffs "on the basis of a tenuous justification that
has little or no merit" (Id. at 671).
Section
health

78-14-4 discriminates

care

feasors.

providers

and

children

between children
injured

injured

by all other

by

tort

The purpose of §78-14-4 is to lessen the great increase

in insurance costs and premiums. Utah Code Ann. §78-14-2.
However, studies
all

medical

California's
Protection

show that less than one-seventh

malpractice

claims

Medical

Injury

Challenge,

52

involve

Compensation

So.Cal.L.Rev.
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minors.
Reform

829,

Act

960-961

(1/7) of
Jenkins,
on

Equal
(1979).

Those

same

claims

studies

are

recognize

show

discovered

that

90% of

within

four

all

medical

years.

malpractice

(Id.)

Courts

that most claims of minors will be brought quickly.

Barrio v. San Manuel Division Hospital, 692 P.2d 280, 286 (Ariz.
1984).

Obviously,

any

effect

that

the

long-tail

claims

of

minors have on the medical profession can only be de minimus.
Further, there certainly has been no showing that minor's
long-tail

claims

have

a

meaningful

insurance industry in Utah.

effect

on

the

medical

Any such effect would be offset, to

a degree by welfare, and is merely cumulative in light of all the
other medical malpractice legislation that has been enacted.

The

need to discriminate against minors is therefore of "little or no
merit"

and

does

not

satisfy

Malan's

equal

protection

test.

Malan's directive that arbitrary classifications not be used just
to lower premiums hammers that point home.
Scott v. School Board of Granite School District, 568 P.2d
746

(Utah

1977)

discriminatory

supports
treatment

protection clause.
issues
general
notice

here,

it

tolling

of

contention
minors,

that

this

violates

kind

Utah's

of

equal

Although Scott did not involve the precise
expressly

provisions

provisions

(Id. at 748).

the

would

stated
to

"work

that

failure

the Governmental
a denial

of

to

apply

the

Immunity Act's

equal

protection."

Other states have similarly held that failure Lo

apply tolling provisions to similar notice requirements violates
equal protection guarantees.

Tafoya v. Doe, 670 P. 2d 582 (N.M.
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App.

1983);

Hunter

v.

North

Mason

High

School,

529

(N.H.

1980)

P.2d

898

the

New

(1974), aff'd. 539 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1975). 8
In

Carson

Hampshire

v.

Supreme

Maurer,
Court

424

A.2d

invalidated

825
the

part

of

a

medical

malpractice act which specified that the state's general statute
of

limitation

medical

tolling

malpractice

provisions

claims.

for minors

The court

did not apply to

declared

the right to

bring a personal injury action to be an "important

substantive

right".
In

determining

the

constitutionality

of

New

Hampshire's

Malpractice Act, the court applied the following test:
Whether the malpractice statute can be
justified
as a reasonable
measure
in
furtherance of the public interest depends
upon whether the restriction of private
riqhts sought to be imposed is not so serious
that it outweighs the benefits sought to be
conferred upon the general public.
(Id. at
831. )
Holding

that elimination of the tolling provisions

for a

minor's medical malpractice claims did not satisfy that test, the
court found that the discrimination did not substantially further
the legislative objective because of the small number of claims
that would be affected.

It further held that the non-tolling

b

Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) utilized the
rational basis test to find Rhode Island's entire Malpractice Act
unconstitutional, apparently on the grounds that the alleged
crisis was not significant.
52

provision unfairly burdened medical malpractice claimants.
at 834.)
E.

(Id.

This Court should make the same ruling.^

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3) Does Not Bar Atkinsons'
Claims for Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation.
Atkinsons'

and fraud.

claims

for negligent

misrepresentation

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3) applies only to actions

on

based

alleged

fraud.

limitations

However,

applied

to

even

if

Atkinsons'

the

claims

3-year
for

statute

of

fraud

and

both

negligent misrepresentation, the statute does not bar Atkinsons'
claims

because

the

statute

does

not

begin

to

run

"until

the

discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the
fraud or mistake."

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3) (1953).

Atkinsons allege the defendants misrepresented the condition
of their child.

Chad was born on March 3, 1983.

did not discover Chad's

The Atkinsons

true condition until Chad was over 3

years old.
Q.

Did you understand that he [Chad] would have
any kind of permanent injury?

A.

No.

Q.

What's your understanding of Chad's condition
now?

A.

[H]e has athetoid quadriplegic.

Q.

When did you first learn that?

A.

I never really learned it.

Q.

At what point in time did you realize that
Chad was not going to be a normal child?

9

Carson, was quoted with approval in Condomarin, supra,

at 9.
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A.

When he was a little over three.

(R. 647, pp. 80, 105.)
In

summary,

the

true

condition

discovered until March, 1986.
1987.

of

the

child

was

The case was filed on

not

July 21,

The time allowed by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3) did not

expire until March of 1989.

The statute does not bar Atkinsons'

claims.
POINT NINE
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
ATKINSONS' CLAIMS FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.
Atkinsons
Olsen

for

damages

sued

fraud

and negligent misrepresentation.

caused

misrepresentations
inadequate
Atkinson.

IHC, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott

by

the

made

by

settlement
(R. 2-12.)

Atkinsons'
defendants

agreement

for

They

reliance

which
their

on

resulted
minor

sought
the
in

son,

an
Chad

However, Atkinsons' CumplaLnt also sought

a declaratory judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-33-1 and
§78-33-2.

Specifically, Atkinsons

asked the District Court to

rule whether the settlement agreement:
(1)

Requires IHC to pay costs of institutionalization;

(2)

Requires IHC to pay occupational therapy costs;

(3)

Requires IHC to pay speech therapy costs, and;

(4)

Requires IHC to pay custodial care costs.

The agreement specifically requires IHC to pay all medical
costs, including treatment, hospitalization and therapy, but it
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doesn't specifically say whether IHC must pay items (2), (3) and
(4).

(R. 15-16.)
The

agreement

also

requires

IHC

to

provide

whatever

assistance is required to qualify for institutionalization, but
it

doesn't

say

whether

IHC

must

pay

the

costs

of

institutionalization.
Plaintiffs
Atkinsons

also

must

requested

obtain

the

the

Court

permission

to

of

declare

IHC

to

whether

sue

other

tortfeasors, i.e., the manufacturer of the hospital monitor.

An

explanatory note to the settlement agreement provides:
[N]o action will be filed by the Atkinsons
against any potential tortfeasors without
the prior written consent of Intermountain
Health Care Hospitals, Inc. (R. 19.)
The

explanatory

note

contradicts

another

part

of

the

agreement which provides:
This release and assignment should in no way
limit or affect the Atkinsons' right to
pursue
claims
against
other
potential
tortfeasors excluding Intermountain Health
Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Children's
Hospital. (R. 15.)
At the hearing for the approval of the settlement, the Judge
understood that Atkinsons could pursue other tortfeasors.
[M]y understanding was they had -- would have
a right to pursue claims against other
potential tortfeasors excluding IHC which was
the petitioner.
(Fishier Depo. p. 15)
There

is

evidence

to

suggest

that

the

explanatory

note

prohibiting Atkinsons suing tortfeasors without JHC's consent was
not

part

of

the

court

approved
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settlement

agreement.

Judge

Fishier could not recall the explanatory note as being part of
the proceedings.
Q:

[M]r. Fishier, . . . do you recall whether
the, . . proposed release and explanatory
note were attached to the petitions in the
Chad Atkinson proceeding?

A:

I can't recall.

Q:

Did you read the explanatory note on the day
you entered your approval of Chad Atkinson's
claim?

A:

I can't recall.

A:

[I] can't say that
document before.

I've

ever

seen

this

(Fishier depo. p. 15, 16, 17.)
It is no wonder the Judge couldn't recall the explanatory
note.

The

billing

statement

generated

by

Morgan,

Scalley

&

Reading shows that the explanatory note was noL prepared until 4
days after the court hearing.

A copy is attached in the addendum

of this brief.
Section 78-33-2 of the Declaratory Judgment Act provides:
Any person interested under a . . . written
contract.
. . may have determined any
question of construction. . . under the . . .
contract. . . and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal regulations
thereunder.
Further, §78-33-3 of the same act states:
A contract may be construed either before or
after there has been a breach thereof.
The Atkinsons properly brought their declaratory action to
have

the

custodial

Court

determine

care

and

whether

institutional
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IHC

would

costs.

pay

They

all

therapy,

also

properly

brought this action to determine their legal right or status to
sue other tortfeasors, without IHC's consent.
At the hearing on IHC, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott
Olsen's

motions

for

summary

judgment,

the

trial

court

was

informed of the declaratory judgment part of the lawsuit.
Mr. Gardiner:

Nothing yet has been said
about
the
declaratory
action
part
of
the
lawsuit, so naturally I
would like to. The first
part of the declaratory
action we ask the Court
to determine what the
contract was to mean when
it provided for medical
costs
and
home
care
c o s t s . . . .There
is
a
dispute
as
to
what
they're supposed to pay
and what
they're
not
supposed to pay.
So we
have
asked
for
the
Court's guidance...
The second issue, your
honor, . . . In
the
release. . . approved in
the Court provides that
Atkinsons could sue other
tortfeasors.
. . Four
days later they received
an explanatory note which
said you can't sue other
tortfeasors without the
consent of IHC.
So we
brought this action to
the Court to have you
tell us whether we can
sue other
tortfeasors
without the consent of
IHC.

(Tr. June 13, 1988; pp. 20-21.)
The purpose of the declaratory judgment act is to permit the
examination

of

legal

documents
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and

statutes

to

determine

questions of construction or validity.

Lindon City v. Engineers

Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981).
Atkinsons

action squarely meets both purposes.

Atkinsons

asked the Court to construe the contract to determine what costs
IHC must pay and to determine the validity of the explanatory
note.

Judge Young's decision should be reversed and remanded for

trial of the declaratory action.
POINT TEN
THE COURT ABUvSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING ATKINSONS' MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT.
A.

Introduction.
Atkinsons do not concede that their claims are for medical

malpractice.

See Points Five and Six of this brief.

However,

prior to the summary judgment hearing, Atkinsons moved to amend
their Complaint.
(1)

The amended complaint did three things:

It changed the formula for calculating damages to the

value of the prior claim less the value of the settlement;
(2)

It clarified Atkinsons' claims against Morgan;

(3)

It

Atkinsons

alleged

a

claim

for

medical

malpractice.

The

filed their Notice of Intent to Commence Action with

the medical pre-litigation panel on January 8, 1988.

On April

18, 1988 the panel determined the Atkinsons' claims had merit.
Atkinsons moved to amend their Complaint on June 6,

1988.

(R.

525.)
Judge Young denied the Motion to Amend because
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"I believe

that the Motions

for Summary

Judgment dispose of that.

(Tr., p. 45.)
B.

The Lower Court Abused Its Discretion.
Amended complaints, like Atkinsons amended complaint, which

clarify

issues,

and

supply

previous

looked upon with favor by the Courts.
Ins.

Exchange,

7

U.2d

161,

320

factual

omissions,

are

e.g. McGavin v. Preferred

P.2d

1109

(1958);

Spell

v.

McDaniel, 591 F.Supp. 1090 (E.D.N.C. 1984). Further, a change in
legal theory does not
e.g.

justify a denial of a motion to amend.

Ward Electronics Service, Inc. v. First Commercial Bank,

819 F.2d 496 (4th Cir. 1987).
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, 15, provides
amend

shall

be

rule,

permitting

freely

given when

amendments,

further the interests of

is

justice.

jus Lice

to be

that leave to

so requires.

liberally

This

construed

to

Gillman v. Hansen, 26 U.*2d

165, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971) .
Further, while the trial court has some discretion, a motion
to amend should not be denied if the motion is not frivolous, nor
brought in bad faith and creates no undue prejudice.

e.g. United

States v. 1984 Chevrolet Transtar, 623 F.Supp. 625

( C D . Conn.

1985) .
In this case no one alleged
(1)

the Motion to Amend was frivolous; or

(2)

brought in bad faith; or

(3)

created any undue prejudice.
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The

motion

to

amend

was

denied

simply

because

defendants' motions for summary judgment were granted.

the

Each of

the respondents' arguments for granting the summary judgment have
been previously addressed in this brief.
the

malpractice

statute

of

However, the idea that

limitations

would

bar

Atkinsons'

malpractice claim deserves further analysis.
Assuming arguendo that Atkinsons alleged a claim for medical
malpractice; the medical malpractice statute of limitations does
not

begin

conduct.

to

run

until

Atkinsons

discover

the

tortfeasor's

e.g. Yerkes v. Rockwood Clinic, 527 P.2d 680 (Wash App.

1974) .
As

discussed

in

Point

Eight

above,

Atkinsons

did

not

discover the extent of their child's injury and the falsity of
IHC,

Scott

Wetzel

Services,

Inc.

and

Scott

Olsen's

misrepresentations until Chad was 3 years older, March 3, 1986.
The 2 yr. medical malpractice statute of limitations would not
expire

until

malpractice
malpractice

March

of

action

in

statute of

1988.

Atkinsons

January

of

commenced

1988.

Thus

the medical
the

medical

limitations does not bar any claim

for

medical malpractice that Atkinsons may have against IHC.
CONCLUSION
None of the theories raised

in the lower court support a

summary judgment dismissing Atkinsons' Complaint for malpractice
against

Steve

misrepresentation

Morgan,
against

or
the

for
other
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fraud

and

respondents.

negLigent
This

case

should

be

remanded

to

the

district

court

with

instructions

allowing Atkinsons' Amended ComplaintDATED this

day of

y^ff*

, 1989.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
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ADDENDUM

Sec. 11.

[Courts open—Redress of injuries.]

All courts shall bo open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy bv due course
ofjaw, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay;
and no person shnll be barred from prosecuting or defending before
anv fTjhiinal in this Stale, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
Tie is a parj;y.

All laws of a general nature M*U

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction then-of, arc eiti/ens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. Xo State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States:
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

78-14-3. Definition of terms.
Q) 'Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, association corporation, or other facility or institution who causes to be rendered
or who renders health care or professional services as a hospital. physician registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwiie. dentist,
d e ^ r S r i S S t . optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmac S D h v s S Aeranist. podiatrist, psychologist, chiropractic physician
naturopathk phvsician. osteopathic physician, osteopathic physician and
^ r a S l o g i s t . speech pathologist, certified socia worker social
s ^ f c e worker social service aide, marriage and family counselor, or
^^tio^rSoSLxncs.
and others rendering similar care and services
J e S n ^ or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of
l l l ^ t and officers, employee, or agents of any of the above acting in
the course and scope of their employment.
(29) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of
warranty, wrongful death or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should
have been rendered by the health care provider.
(30> "Health care" means any act, or treatment performed or furnished,
or which should have been performed or
^
^
^
^
^
^
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient s medical care,
treatment or confinement.

io-i4-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Application.
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the
injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the
alleged act. omission, neglect or occurrence, except that:
*a> In an action where the allegation against the health care provider
is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body,
the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left
in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; and
<b> In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of
minority or other legal disability under § 78-12-36 or any other provision of
the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice
actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries
which occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that
any action which under former law could have been commenced after the
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion
of time allowed under former law; but any action which under former law
could have been commenced more than four years after the effective date of
this act may be commenced only within four years after the effective date of
this act.

78-12-26. Within three vears.
Within three years:
(1) an action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property;
except that when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact? constituting such
waste or trespass.
• 2) an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for specific recovery thereof: except that m all cases where
the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term
"livestock," which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by the defendant.
<3> an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that
the cause of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.

78-33-3.

Contracts.

A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breac
thereof.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1: C. 1943,
Supp., 104-33-3.

78-33-2. Rights, status, legal relations under instruments
or statutes may be determined.
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, or whose
rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal
ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal
relations thereunder.

Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant.
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute mav
sue S h i s own name without joining with Mm the party for whose benefit the
action is brought; and when a statute so provides an action for the use or
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted m the name of the
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after ,abjection
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder orsubst itutaonof
the real party in interest: and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall
have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the
W f a n i o r ^ o m p e t e n t p e r s o n , When an mfant or an insane or
incompetent person is a party, he must appear either by his general guardian
or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court; in
which the action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed m any
case when it is deemed bv the court in which the action or proceeding is
prosecuted expedient to represent the infant, insane or incompetent person in
the action or proceeding, notwithstanding he may have a general guardian
and may have appeared by him. In an action in rem it shall not be necessary
to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might be an infant
or an incompetent person.
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. When a guardian ad litem is
appointed by a court, he must be appointed as follows:
(1) when the infant is plaintiff, upon the application of the infant, if he
is of the age of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the application of
a relative or friend of the infant.
(2) when the infant is defendant, upon the application of the infant if
he is of the age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after the
service of the summons, or if under that age or if he neglects so to apply,
then upon the application of a relative or friend of the infant, or of any
other party to the action.
(3) When an infant defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff,
upon motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some suitable person to be guardian ad litem for such infant defendant, unless the
defendant or someone in his behalf within 20 days after service of notice
of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such infant.
Service of such notice may be made upon the general or testamentary
guardian of such defendant, if he has one in his state; if not, such notice,
together with the summons in the action, shall be served in the manner
provided for publication of summons upon such infant, if over fourteen
years of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by such service on the
person with whom such infant resides. The guardian ad litem for such
nonresident infant defendant shall have 20 days after his appointment in
which to plead to the action.
C4) when an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or
proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or
incompetent person, or of any other party to the action or proceeding.
(dj A s s o c i a t e s m a y be sued by c o m m o n n a m e . When two or more persons associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership
or other association, not a corporation, transact such business under a common name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they
may be sued by such common name; and any judgment obtained against the
defendant in such case shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the
same manner as if all had been named defendants and had been sued upon
their joint liability.
(ej Action a g a i n s t a n o n r e s i d e n t d o i n g b u s i n e s s in this s t a t e . When a
nonresident person is associated in and conducts business within the state of
Utah in one or more places in his own name or a common trade name, and
said business is conducted under the supervision of a manager, superintendent, or agent, said person may be sued in his own name in any action arising

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
fa) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
<b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, i
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, tk
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
(d> Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upa
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve;
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or evens
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall
so order, specifying the time therefor.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially identical to Rule 15, F.R.C.P.
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PAUL S. FELT (A1055) of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant
Scott Wetzel Services, Inc.
and Scott Olsen
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOooROGER ATKINSON, POLLY
ATKINSON and ROGER ATKINSON
AND POLLY ATKINSON, as
guardians ad litem for CHAD
ATKINSON,

ORDER GRANTING THE MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF IHC
HOSPITALS, INC., SCOTT WETZEL
SERVICES, INC. AND SCOTT
OLSEN AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO FILE AN AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO COMPEL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
IHC HOSPTIALS, INC. aka
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE
HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah
corporation, SCOTT WETZEL
SERVICES, INC., a corporation
SCOTT OLSEN; STEPHEN G.
MORGAN, MORGAN, SCALLEY &
READING and JOHN DOES I
through X,

Civil No. C-87-4908
Judge David S. Young

Defendants.
ooOooThe motion of Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc. for summary
judgment and the motion of Defendants Scott Wetzel Services,
Inc. and Scott Olsen for summary judgment came on as noticed
for hearing on the 13th day of June, 1988, before the Honorable
LAY, QUINNEY
& NEBEKER
HMI Drsrrrl libit*

David S. Young, District Judge, with Dale F. Gardiner of
Robert J. DeBry & Associates appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs,
David B. Erickson of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell on behalf
of Defendant Intermountain Health Care, Paul S. Felt of Ray,
Quinney & Nebeker appearing on behalf of Defendants Scott
Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen and Shawn McGarry of
Kipp & Christian appearing on behalf of Defendants Stephen
G. Morgan and Morgan, Scalley & Reading.

Plaintiffs1 motion

to file a second amended complaint and plaintiffs1 motion
to compel discovery against IHC were also heard.

Based upon

the pleadings, memoranda on file, argument of counsel and
good cause here appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant IHC!s motion
for summary judgment be and is hereby granted and that Plaintiffs1
Complaint against IHC is dismissed with prejudice and on
the merits.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendants Scott Wetzel
Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen!s motion for summary judgment
be and hereby is granted.

Plaintiffs1 Complaint against

Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen is dismissed
with prejudice and on the merits.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs1 motion to
file a second amended complaint and Plaintiffs1 motion to

UINNEY
*EKER
•ret Bid?.
KF. O l Y ,
U4 1 I I
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compel discovery against Defendant IHC be and are hereby
denied.

7 / ^ day of

\JjJLnS

By

iUINNEY
'.BKKER
srn-t Bld(?
AKE

Cnv,

i 84111
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CERTIFICTE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order Granting The Motions for Summary Judgment
of IHC Hospitals, Inc., Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott
Olsen and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to File an Amended Complaint
and Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel was mailed, postage prepaid,
on this

Jl^day of

June, 1988, to the following:

Dale F. Gardiner
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
B- Lloyd Poelman
David B. Erickson
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599
Carman E. Kipp
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
175 East 400 South, #330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314

QUINNEY
4EBEKER
Descret Bldg
I \KI
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CARMAN E. KIPP A1829
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN. P C .
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
CITY CENTBE I
#330
175 EAST 4 0 0 SOUTH
S A L T L A K E CITY, U T A H 8«3HI 231-4

(SOI) 521 3773

Attorneys for Stephen G. Morgan and Morgan, Scalley & Reading
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROGER ATKINSON; POLLY
ATKINSON; and ROGER ATKINSON
and POLLY ATKINSON, as
guardians ad litem for
CHAD ATKINSON,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER

vs.
IHC HOSPITAL, INC. aka
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE
HOSPITALS, INC., UTAH
corporation, SCOTT WETZEL
SERVICES, INC., SCOTT OLSEN;
STEPHEN G. MORGAN; MORGAN,
SCALLEY & READING; and
JOHN DOES I thorough X,

Civil No.: C87-4908

Judge David Young

Defendants.

The motion of defendants Stephen G. Morgan and Morgan,

Scalley

& Reading

for Summary

Judgement

came on as scheduled

for hearing on March 28, 1988 at 9:00 a.m, before the Honorable
David Young, District Court Judge; plaintiffs being represented
by their attorney Dale Gardiner of the firm of Robert J.

DeBry

& Associates; defendants Stephen G. Morgan and Morgan, Scalley
&

Reading being represented

Kipp

by Carman E. Kipp of the firm of

and Christian, P. C ,

for Defendant

Scott

Wetzel

and attorney

Paul

Felt

appearing

and the Court having reviewed the

briefs, affidavits and discovery materials which had been filed
by counsel and having heard the arguments of counsel and being
fully advised in the premises.
IT
defendants
Motion

IS

HEREBY

Stephen

for Summary

ORDERED,

G. Morgan
Judgment

ADJUDGED

AND DECREED

and Morgan, Scalley
of no cause

that

& Readings1

of action

in their

favor and against plaintiffs should be and the same is hereby
granted.
Dated this

O

day of March, 1988.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE:

f

W-y-W^TS-'

B
David Young

Approved as to Form:
9y

aoChRISTIAN PC
ORNEYS ATW AW
CENTRE I . #300
AST 4 0 0 SOUTH
LT L A K E CITY
A H 8^(11 2 3 m
lOi) 5 2 1 3 7 7 3

Dale Gardiner
Attorney for Plaintiffs

-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

MAILED,

postage

prepaid,

this

28th

day of March,

1988, a true and correct copy of the the foregoing Order, to
the following:
Dale Gardiner
G. Steven Sullivan
Robert J. DeBry
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Paul S. Felt
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Desert Building
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
B. Lloyd Poelman
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for IHC
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

^yX^oJ^CL^

JPP A N O C H R I S T I A N PC
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW
CITY C E N T R E I
#300
175 E A S T 4 0 0 S O U T H
S A L T L A K E CITY
UTAH 8 4 I I I 23I-4
(OOl) 3 2 1 3 7 7 3
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RELEASE AND ASSIGNMENT OF ALL (TT.ATMc;
ROGER ATKINSON and POLLY ATKINSON, husband and wife and the parol
of Chad Atkinson, born March 2, 1983, residing at 2316 South 600 East,
#4, Salt Lake City, Utah

84106, having reached their majority, for the

sole consideration of payment by Intermountain Health Care Hospitals
Inc.,

as follows :
Medical Cost"Protection:

Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. will pay all medial
costs that include, but are not limited to, treatment! hospitalization
and therapy that are a result of the incident that toAv n i ™ ZZ 5 •
Children's Medical Center on March 4, U S a " ™ ^ 0 ^ ^ ^ ^ " 0 ^
n dt h e r a p y m u s t b e
1
!?6*?1^.110?^"11"^0? ?
byincident
Primary
Children's
Medical Center as being associated with^Proved
the above
S
C in
ay
i
ther
S
^ I f lAtkinson
r t f * d °Kby
S°
'
r^^
'. U mMedical
! a n y ° Center
services
*™???M.
to Chad
Primary
Children's
or anv r»f'w~hI~T«-v
care facility or individual. This portion of the L r e l . T r ! u ? 6 f l t h
medical costs will be valid and in effect until Marlh 2 1 9 9 ^ ^ ^?<?°
Chad reaches his fifteenth birthday whichever comes first
Monthly Payments

PM

15 year guarantee at $500.00 a month or $6,000 per year with *
guaranteed payout of $90,000. 20 year guarantee after 15 yearlof
$
Per
±fe W i t h a
oof
f I$360,000.
^ S T V Guaranteed
* $ 1 ? ' T payments
T r fwill
?? ibe
« « « tAtkinso-n
S d payout
made to8Chad
nr
rnents8 P a r 6 n t S S h ° U l d ^ ^ ^ P r l ° r t 0 t e r m i n a tion of guaranteed payPayments of $1,500 per month or $18,000 t»er vea-r tn i,a «,.,,»« 4.
Chad Atkinson should he survive beyond the gnaltltltd\lLlnrTt
r°
A
above, with these contingent payments to b e ^ e u n t i l ^ C Teltl
Tf"c^d
f Chad
Atkinson. Normal payout 65 years of $900,000.

Education Protection:
Beginning on March 4, 1998, Chad, or his parents should Chad H-f*
prior to any of these dates, will be paid $15,000 per yla? for a total
of eight such parents co De paid on March 4th of each vear thr-^li
2 u

4
0f

*iitovot?

=uf-teed **y°? °f $"0,000 toe:sj;*npSsSt

ot Chad s e d u c a t i o n a l expenses, i f n e c e s s a r y .
Investment P r o t e c t i o n :
On March 4 , 2003 .; luzip sun of $50,000 w-m u* ^ - r ^ _

r^y^eiiu
^

,

ch

Unlorcseen

I r^^* ><= ^>Y the P a r e n t s :

A one time payment of $20,000 will be paid to the paren- s uf Jhad
upon finalizing and approval of the court, of the settlement b> twe«;i
Primary Children1s Medical Center and the parents of Chad Atkin. ;n.
Total guaranteed payouts to Chad or his parents:
Total payouts to Chad and his parents should
Chad live a normal lifetime of 65 years:

$

7*. oOO

1,280, 00

Hereby on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor child,
Chad Atkinson, and their heirs, executors, administrators, successors assigns release, acquit and forever discharge Intermountain Health Care
Hospitals, Inc., and Primary Children's Medical Center or their agents,
servants, successors, heirs, executors, administrators, of and from any
and all claims, actions, causes of action, demands, rights, damages,
costs, loss of service, expenses and compensation whatsoever, which the
undersigneds or their minor child, Chad Atkinson, now have or which may
hereafter accure on account of or in any way growing out of any and all
known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries
and property damage and the consequences thereof resulting or to result
from the accident, casualty or event which occurred on or about the 4th
day of March, 1983, at the Primary Children's Medical Center.
In addition, the undersigneds on their own behalf and on behalf of
their minor child, Chad, for the consideration set forth above, do heret
release all other potential tort feasors up to the amount paid by Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. for medical expenses, the annuity a
the $20,000 in cash and hereby assign to Intermountain Health Care Hospi
tals, Inc., or its successors or assigns, the Atkinsons1 claims against
all other potential tort feasors up to the amount paid by Intermountain
Health Care Hospitals, Inc. for medical expenses, the annuity and the
$20,000 in cash but this re lease and assignment should in no way limit or
affect the Atkinsons1 right to pursue claims against other potential tor
feasors, excluding Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary
Children's Hospital, for damages above and beyond the amount paid by

/«ncJ m e

$*>o.OOO

in

eii^'ii.^

ic

is

specifically

agreed

and un~

that Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. is subrogated
entitled to pursue the above-mentioned claims in the names of

stood

o ana is
^er

Atkinson, Polly Atkinson or Chad Atkinson against any and all oz.

r

persons, firms, corporations, and other entities.
It is understood and agreed that this settlement is the comprv. :.se
of a doubtful and disputed claim, and that the payment made is not to
be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the party or
parties hereby released, and that said releasees deny liability therefor
and intend merely to avoid litigation and buy their peace.
The undersigneds hereby declare and represent that the injuries
sustained by Chad Atkinson are or may be permanent and progressive and
that recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite and in making this
release and assignment it is understood and agreed, that the undersigneds rely wholly upon the undersigneds1 judgment, belief and knowledge of the nature, extent, affect and duration of said injuries and
liability therefor and is made without reliance upon any statement or
representation of the party or parties hereby released or their representatives or by any physician or surgeon by them employed.
The undersigneds further declare and represent that no promise,
inducement or agreement not herein expressed has been made to the undersigneds and that this release and assignment contains the entire agreement
between the parties hereto, that the undersigneds have obtained court
approval to enter into this release and assignment for and on behalf of
their minor child, Chad Atkinson, and that the terms of this release
and agreement are contractual and not mere recital.
Neither this release and assignment nor any payment pursuant thereto shall be construed as an admission of any liability, such being expressly denied, nor as a waiver by or an estoppel of any of the parties^

herein released to make claim for any damages which they sustc* °ct,
their claims and causes of action with respect thereto being exp:: ^ly
reserved.,
*SEE EXPLANATORY NOTE ATTACHED WHICH IS A PART OF THIS AGRE". '
THE UNDERSIGNEDS HAVE READ THE FOREGOING RELEASE AND ASSIGNMENT
AND FULLY UNDERSTAND IT.
Signed and sealed and delivered this £ ^
CAUTION:

day of July, 1983.

READ BEFORE SIGNING BELOW

GEK ATKINSON

m($$$>««<'
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) ss
On the ^.^T^day of

\J^c/^oj^

, 1983, before me personally

appeared Roger Atkinson and Polly Atkinson to be known to be the persons
named herein and who executed the foregoing release and assignment,,

Residing in S
My Commission Expires:

City, Utah

EXPLANATORY NOTE
The intent and primary purpose 'of the Atkinsons In signii;k thLS
Release is to fully release Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, 'no.
and Primary Children's Medical Center in consideration for the inc *y
paid and to be paid pursuant to the Release and Assignment, but i:.
addition to do whatever is necessary by this release, assignment 01
otherwise to assist Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and
Primary Children's Medical Center in getting back the money paid an»
to be paid pursuant to this Release and Assignment from any other
tortfeasor and for this reason, (1) the Atkinsons have released all
other potential tort feasors but only for the purpose of allowing Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Children's Medical
Center to obtain contribution from all other tort feasors pursuant
to § 78-27-40, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, up to the full
amount paid and to be paid, and (2) the Atkinsons have assigned their
claims to Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Children's Medical Center up to the amount paid and to be paid for the purpose
of allowing Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary
Children's Medical.Center to seek full reimbursement from all other
tort feasors up to the full amount paid out and to be paid.
This Release and Assignment, however, is also intended and a
secondary purpose of it, is not to discharge the other potential tort
feasors from the Atkinsons' claims, but only to reduce the Atkinsons'
claims against the other tort feasors by the amount paid and to be paid
by Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Children's
Medical Center or the percentage of fault attributable to Intermountain
Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Children's Medical- Center, whichever is greater, as provided for in § 78-27-42, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, as long as this secondary purpose does not preclude
the primary purpose, as set forth above, from being accomplished.
Thus, in accordance therewith, in the event an action is commenced
by the Atkinsons and/or in their name against any other tort feasor
for claims arising out of the incident of March 4, 1983, and any other
tortfeasor commences litigation against Intermountain Health Care
Hospitals, Inc. or Primary Children's Medical Center, for contribution
and/or indemnity by counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party complaint
or otherwise, the Atkinsons hereby consent that the relative degrees of
fault of each tortfeasor shall be determined in terms of percentages
in the action commenced by the Atkinsons and/or in their name. If a
final determination in the Atkinsons' litigation is made that Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. or Primary Children's Medical Center
is responsible for any percentage of the damages sustained by Chad
Atkinson, the total amount of Chad Atkinson's damages shall be reduced
before judgment is entered against any other tort feasor by an amount
equal to such percentage. The judgment entered shall then be payable
first to Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. up to the amount paid
by it for medical costs, the annuity and the $20,000 in cash and the
balance remaining shall be payable to the Atkinsons for and on behalf
of Chad Atkinson.

It is also understood and agreed that no action will be filed by
the Atkinsons against any other potential tort feasor without he prior
written consent and approval of Intermountain Health Care Hos-p.. als,
Inc. We_understand that Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, I: -. may
not be willing to give its written consent and approval because i.-'ch
an action would in all probability result in Intermountain Health
Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Children's Medical Center being n»'-ied
as a party against whom contribution would be sought and in light o.' thi
publicity which might attend such a case, Intermountain Health Care
Hospitals, Inc. may wish to avoid such exposure. However, if such ar>
action is filed, with such written consent and approval, then it is
understood and agreed that any judgment collected or settlement receive
will be paid first to Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. up to
the amount paid and to be paid under the Release and Assignment and
the balance remaining to the Atkinsons. The Atkinsons specifically
grant their authority and permission to Intermountain Health Care
Hospitals, Inc. to make demand upon all other potential tort feasors
for the full amount of the Atkinsons' claims, and to accept a settlement of the entire claim up to the amount paid and to be paid by
Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. pursuant to this Release and
Assignment. It is understood and agreed that Intermountain Health Care
Hospitals, Inc. may desire to seek out and determine such settlement
opportunities without the necessity of filing suit or legal actions
against other potential tort feasors.
THE UNDERSIGNED HAVE READ THE FOREGOING EXPLANATORY NOTE AND FULtt
UNDERSTAND IT AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT IS PART OF THE RELEASE AND ASSIGNMENT OF ALL CLAIMS.
Signed, sealed and delivered this A 1?

day of July, 1983.

CAUTION: READ BEFORE SIGNING BELOW

ertr Atkinson

'/

%&M&F°
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

ss.

On the -z6> day of July, 1983, before me personally appeared Roger
Atkinson and Polly Atkinson, being known to me to be the persons named
herein and who executed the foregoing Explanatory Noj

JOTARY PUBLIC^
Residing in Sa
My Commission Expires

City, Utah

LAW OFFICES

MORGAN,
STEPHEN G MORGAN
FORD G SCALLEY
J BRUCE READING
STEVEN K WALKENHORST
MARK L ANDERSON
BRAD HOLM

A

SCALLEY

&

READING

PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

S A L T

L A K E
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Mr. Scott Olsen
Scott Wetzel Services
833 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

4/83
5/83
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0/83

1/83
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B>-A«NE DAVIS

^f|,

531-7870

J u l y 27,

FOR PROFESS.ONAL SERVICES RENDERED

OF COUNSEL
G

orr-o^^ r, r^ D
S E C O N D FLOOR
26
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A t k i n s o n v s . I n t ermoun t a i n H e a l t h Care
Hospitals, Inc.

Conference with Scott Olsen, intra office conference, legal
research, work on petitions, and telephone call to Mrs.
Atkinson
Preparation of Petition and Consents and telephone conference
to Scott Olsen
Review of petition and intra office conference
Intra office conference, two telephone conferences with Scott
Kelly, two telephone conferences with Rick Johnson, telephone
call to Mr. Atkinson, revise petition and release and prepare
acceptance of conservatorship, order approving settlement
and letters of guardianship
-Two telephone conferences with Scott Kelly, telephone to
Design Benefits, Inc., intra office conference, revise
petition and preparation of release and assignment and
conference with Atkinson

1.50 hrs.
1.50 hrs.
.50 hrs.

3.00 hrs.

4.50 hrs,

LAW

MORGAN
STEPHEN G MORGAN
FORD G SCALLEY
J BRUCE READING
STEVEN K WALKENMORST
MARK L A N D E R S O N
BRAD HOLM

OFFICES

S C A L L E Y <& R E A D I N G

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
SECOND

2 6 1 EAST 3 0 0
SALT

SOUTH

L A K E CITY, U T A H
(SOI)

OF COUNSEL
G BLAINE DAVIS

FLOOR

8*111

531-7870

Mr. Olsen
July 27, 1983
Page Two
Atkinson vs. Intermountain Health Care
FOR P R O F E S S I O N A L SERVICES RENDERED

7/22/83
7/26/83

Conference with Atkinsons and attendance at Court hearing to
obtain approval and obtaining of bond
Preparation of explanatory note and conference with Atkinsons
and Scott Olsen and obtaining certified copies at court and
letters to Atkinsons and Intermountain Health Care c/o
Scott Olsen
17.50 hours at $75.00 per hour
COSTS:
"Filing petition
Premium for Bond
4 Certified copies
Xerox copies

---

$1,312.50

$ 50.00
70.00
75.20
3.40

198.60
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE:

$1,511.10

3.50 hrs

3.00 hrs,
17.50 hrs

